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1The Esoteric Quine?
Belief Attribution and the Significance 
of the Indeterminacy Thesis in Quine’s Kant Lectures
I. Introduction
This paper is adapted from the Introduction written for my German translation of Quine’s Kant Lectures,1
the original English title of which was Science and Sensibilia. The Kant Lectures summarize Quine’s 
philosophy, as of about 1980. They certainly have had some circulation, subsequent to their original presen-
tation at Stanford, and Quine borrowed from them in various publications. Yet the Lectures provide a some-
what different perspective on Quine’s philosophy which is well worth exploring. 
In particular, I would emphasize that what is said in the Lectures throws interesting light on Quine’s char-
acteristic semantic doctrines, centered on the claimed “indeterminacy of translation,” chiefly by means of 
suggested connections between these semantic doctrines and Quine’s concern to limit the effects of in-group 
gullibility on scientific and learned doctrine and acceptance. 
Having written fairly extensively on Quine without early access to the Kant Lectures, I would certainly 
say that I take a somewhat different approach to Quine, now having seen them. In light of the Kant Lectures, 
I see Quine’s philosophy as more deeply empiricist and Humean, more strongly influenced by British models, 
2though doubtlessly retaining commitment to central themes of the pragmatist tradition. The Kant Lectures 
may also allow us to see the pragmatic tradition in a slightly different light. 
The opening of this famous but substantially unpublished work of Quine’s evokes a comparison of his 
own themes to themes from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and if we think of Kant as offering a criticism 
of the a prior metaphysical excesses of pre-critical rationalism, then we might see Quine as somewhat 
similarly engaged in the Lectures, in a critique of a “pre-critical” empiricism, especially as once prevalent 
among the logical positivists. From that perspective, Quine’s critique of the positivists’ conception of 
empirical meaning, in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” may begin to look like a “critique of pure meaning.” In 
degree as the positivists’ conception of meaning was of Kantian or neo-Kantian inspiration, with formative 
empiricist aspirations, then we might also see Quine as continuing Kant’s work, attending to the remnants of 
anti-fallibilistic “rationalism” among the latter-day empiricists. As is evident from other writings by Quine, 
especially those following Word and Object (1960), and “Ontological Relativity” (1969) this “critique of 
pure (purely a priori or conventional) meaning,” turns into an empiricist and behaviorist criticism of 
“mentalistic semantics,” which has met with considerable debate and resistance. Thus the prominence of 
Quine on meaning and translation, over the last 50 years.
Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) was Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy at Harvard 
University. His work and perspective has dominated much of Anglo-American philosophy over decades. He 
is the author of 24 books and hundreds of articles, which have been translated into a multitude of languages, 
around the world. In crucial areas of analytic and theoretical philosophy, including contemporary logic, 
philosophy of science, the theory of knowledge, and the philosophy of language, he has left behind 
monumental milestones; even during his lifetime he was treated as a contemporary master. As might be 
expected from a Harvard empiricist who famously signaled a “turn toward pragmatism,” his influence on 
American neo-pragmatists, such as Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, and Donald Davidson, is important in our 
3understanding of contemporary developments. Quine’s writings remain highly relevant to the on-going 
revival of pragmatism and to American-European exchanges generally. 
Quine was born in 1908 in Akron Ohio. He studied mathematics and philosophy at Oberlin and Harvard, 
calling on Whitehead as his dissertation advisor. His early philosophical inspiration came from Bertrand 
Russell. Later influences include Rudolf Carnap and Alfred Tarski, who he came to know during a stay in 
Prague and Warsaw before World War II. These early influences can be traced throughout his writings. 
The Kant Lectures were originally presented as a series at Stanford University in 1980. Generally, they 
provide a concise and thoughtful overview of Quine’s philosophy, of use for specialists and for tough-minded 
students looking for a summary of Quine. The English originals of the Kant Lectures have not yet been pub-
lished, in view of Quine’s expressed wishes, and my book constitutes the first publication of a German 
translation. This will be the only existing version of the Lectures in print, beyond Michele Leonelli’s Italian 
translation, La Scienza E I Dati di Senso (1987). Quine sent me the Lectures, for translation, in 1997, and he 
assisted with replies and discussions of early drafts from the translation.
II. Scientific Monism and Scientific Pluralism
In its most basic commitments, Quine’s work is an empiricist-pragmatist2 philosophy of science, including 
strongly mathematical, logical, nominalistic, and highly formalistic components; these commitments are 
partly formulated in the “monistic physicalism” featured in the opening Lecture. Monistic physicalism, as 
Quine argues, is much to be preferred to the major traditional alternatives of monistic mentalism, or dualistic 
interactionism. 
An alternative not considered in those pages, however, is to embed the problems of the relations of 
physical and psychological descriptions and theory into the broader context of the relations of distinct 
subject-matters and disciplines, an approach which we might describe as a matter of scientific pluralism. The 
4pragmatist tradition prior to Quine is suggestive of such an approach; and even in the present text there is the 
related problem of the specifics of relations between physics, its concepts and generalizations, and the 
“physicalistic” concepts of Quine’s behavioristic psychology. What counts as “physicalistic” for Quine is not 
exhausted by what we can find in physics proper, and the programmatic remarks on reduction to physics do 
not insure their own success. The fact that there are various sciences, disciplines and areas of research should 
certainly suggest that we do not always understand, with great precision, the relations among them.3
Although we seek mechanisms in chemistry, say, to understand or explain biological phenomena, there is 
no guarantee that success will be forthcoming on the basis of contemporary chemistry. Instead it seems just 
as reasonable to expect some elaborations of both chemistry and biology arising from questions about their 
relationship. We certainly do not know that we will ever be able to get along without biology as a more or 
less independent science, employing its own characteristic generalizations and concepts. The objects and 
phenomena investigated in biology, or in psychology, cannot now be sufficiently described and differentiated 
purely by means of the language, concepts, and laws of physics; and perhaps this will never be accomplished. 
Still that point does not imply that the generalizations and regularities of chemistry, biology, or psychology 
violate the recognized laws of physics. The simply fact is that the recognized generalizations and laws of the 
various sciences are not all part of contemporary physics. 
Quine argues in the Kant Lectures that monistic physicalism is to be preferred, because dualistic 
interactionism and monistic mentalism have so many theoretical disadvantages. He is convinced that the 
dualism of mind and matter must place the physicists’ conservation laws in question. Dualism, on Quine’s 
view, is anti-naturalistic and super-naturalistic. However that may be, though, I think it can be argued that 
versions of scientific pluralism, seen in light of the pragmatist tradition, are not subject to similar objections. 
Mind and life are responsible for the propagation of cultures, artifacts and habits; and thinking of living 
things in particular, the propagation of organisms, each as a rule after its own kind. Both mind and life create 
5new organization of the physical world. They have their effects on the physical world, because they make use
of physical resources, energy and materials and re-order them. If we allow that the special objects of 
psychology and biology have such effects, then clearly something physical is involved. But it seems just as 
clear that things psychological and biological are involved. Still we do not understand the relationships 
precisely enough to say exactly how this goes in all possible detail.
But to consider a more specific possible objection, it seems clear that the second law of thermodynamics 
does not forbid the creation of new order in the world of physics. It does not show that the development of 
new cultural orderings of the world, or of new biological species and their specific regularities of function 
and reproduction are impossible. It only tells us that if new order is created in one place, then this must be at 
the expense of increasing disorder in some larger environment. I am tempted to say that in trying to under-
stand the relationships between the objects and laws of the various sciences and disciplines, philosophers 
have too often underrated the simple facts involved in our having these various distinctive sciences and 
disciplines. Generally, I think there is nothing in the laws of physics which shows the impossibility, within 
limited domains, of new orders of chemical, biological, psychological, or cultural regularities arising. There 
is nothing to show that new or emerging regularities and activities, studied by the diverse sciences and 
disciplines must violate the recognized laws of physics. On the contrary, physics must always remain open to 
these possibilities. This it does, in contrast with physicalistic philosophers, chiefly by failing to making any 
comment on the biological qua biological, or the psychological qua psychological, etc.
The pragmatic tradition before Quine renders similar positions plausible: Scientific pluralism implies non-
reductive naturalism;4 and there are related problems in Quine’s text regarding the details of the relationship 
between physics its concepts and generalizations and the “physicalistic concepts of Quine’s behavioristic 
psychology. Quine’s conception of the “physicalistic” depends partly on epistemological conditions and is not 
exhausted within physics itself. The programmatic remarks concerning reduction to physics do not guarantee 
6their own success. There are always a host of empirical questions involved in the relation of distinctive 
domains of inquiry. These arise in part from the Quinean point, made in criticism of radical reductionism, in 
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism” that the significance of a hypothesis cannot be equated with a particular range 
of evidence. Far less do the generalizations of distinct domains have any self-evident or easily inferred 
relation to those of another. 
It is worth noting in this connection that Quine questions the generality of Davidson’s “anomalous 
monism” in the Kant Lectures, though elsewhere he has seemed to endorse it. The question is whether, and in 
what sense, there are available to us common-sense or scientific regularities of the relations between per-
ception and the objects of perception. If there were no such regularities, then our ability to learn the language 
reporting perception would be something of a mystery. Quine argues in the Kant Lectures that our acquisition 
of language depends on the ability of our original teachers to observe and eventually to report the 
observations of the students, something of obvious use in teaching by ostension. Recognizing regularities in 
the relations between perception and the objects of perception at a common-sense level, it seems evident that 
various scientific reformulations will also be possible. But if there are regularities in the relationship between 
perception and the objects of perception, then Davidson’s general thesis of the anomaly of the mental 
becomes problematic. We have to recognize psycho-physical regularities that are subject to scientific inquiry 
and reformulation. Similarly, though we suppose that generalizations crafted in terms of stimulus meaning, 
say, have some determinable relationship to talk of physical dispositions, the exact relationship here is 
subject to empirical inquiry. That is a general lesson about the character of the relationships between 
physical and psychological concepts.
Quine’s behaviorism takes in the perspective of Clark Hull (and Roger Shepard) as mentioned in the 
Lectures, and his distinctively behavioristic semantic doctrines are best viewed as consequences of his 
empiricism and physicalism. Though Quine’s behaviorism is primarily methodological, it culminates in a 
7quasi-skeptical, and nominalistic, stance concerning linguistic meaning and meanings, especially regarding 
meaning conceived in terms of the analytic-synthetic distinction. But not all contemporary approaches to 
meaning and meanings rely on the analytic-synthetic distinction. Of some importance in this are approaches 
which generalize the Fregean context principle, seeing the meanings of words as depending not only on 
sentential context, as in distinct dictionary entries, e.g., but also on the broader context of theoretic develop-
ment, as expressed, say, in encyclopedia entries.5 Taking such an approach to meaning holds out some 
prospect of escape from the excesses of Quine’s behaviorism.
III. Sense and Sensibility
One might expect that Quine evokes C.D. Broad in his opening, and in the title of the First Lecture, 
“Mind and its Place in Nature,” since this is a quite classical reference of empiricist and naturalistic 
conceptions of mind. More puzzling, perhaps is the English title of the Lecture Series, Science and Sensi-
bilia, playing on that of John L. Austin’s book, Sense and Sensibilia and the suggested connection of this 
with Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility. Novelist Austen appears to get equal billing with philosophers 
Broad and Austin.
The point created some problems in translating the title of the Lecture series, and it evokes a chain of 
fascinating connections. Jane Austen is famed as expressing a sensibility overcoming both pride and 
prejudice; while J. L. Austin practiced his common-sense, ordinary language philosophy, dispensing with the 
sense-data of old, partly by selectively browsing the great Oxford English Dictionary. Equally, J. L. Austin 
is noted as a defender of common-sense realism concerning perception, and he makes good use of Frege’s 
context principle when concerned, in his famous article, with “The Meaning of a Word.”
The lecture series includes a considerable focus on a theme which we might think of under the title of 
“sensibility,” or even perhaps “mentality.” Notice, for example, the title of the third Lecture, which invites us 
8to think of human beings as a kind of “forked animal.” We are “forked” or divided between our focus on the 
natural world around us, a focus featured in empiricism and in the natural sciences, and a contrasting focus 
on other human beings, engagement in the particular human environments of our socialization and develop-
ment. Making the linguistic turn with Austin and Quine, and turning to the natural world and our (translating) 
dictionaries, might we thus do better managing the problems of our particularities of pride and prejudice? Or, 
alternatively, taking common-sense and ordinary experience more seriously, might we better say, to para-
phrase Jane Austen, in the opening of Pride and Prejudice, that “it is a truth universally acknowledged,” that 
a scientific philosophy, “in possession of a good fortune,” must be “in want” of a fuller relation to common 
experience and to life? At least this is plausible in contrast with the idea, and Quinean dictum that 
“philosophy of science is philosophy enough.” 
Consider the humanities. Asking about “mind and its place in nature,” in Broad’s phrase, though 
explicitly rejecting Broad’s approach to mental contents, Quine looks to bridge the gap here, say, the gap 
between conceptions of language as primarily cognitive, and needed in our struggles with (or conquests of) 
nature, and conceptions of language as primarily a means of communication. Wittgenstein’s “private 
language argument” has a special place in the opening pages. Without our focus on other human beings, there 
could be no language learning, and neither languages or science. Thus the need of Quine’s turn toward men-
talistic observation sentences, those reporting what others perceive. But Quine clearly favors the “sensibility” 
of the natural sciences, with its strong orientation to the non-human world, suggesting the need for “be-
havioristic discipline” in reconstruction of the traditional “sensibility” of the humanities, regarding our 
general orientation to the perceptual world, and in criticism of the gullibilities of belief. 
The Quinean critique of  “meaning,” “belief,” and “mentalistic semantics” suggest serious defects in the 
humanities, education in particular, and in human relations generally, where these are not built on a shared 
gaze beyond the human world and a strongly factual orientation. He argues for a revision of those humanistic 
9sensibilities which focus exclusively or excessively on particularities of human relations, conceived in terms 
of the “myth of the museum:” The idea is that whatever is said and grammatically well formed must have its 
particular and legitimate meaning, independent of relationship to the development of ascertainable evidence, 
and is thus suited to be entertained, accepted or rejected. Quine takes up a behavioristic and empiricist 
critique of this idea of “pure meanings” —meaning as purely conventional.
Still, Quine can be found to recommend the kind of explorations of our collective preconceptions, as prac-
ticed by J. L. Austin — though there is little acknowledgment of a need to resist thinking of collective 
preconceptions as merely preconceptions. There is some room for speculative developments and comparisons 
of claims, theses and presuppositions, and no simple reduction of meaning to evidence. Quine resists our 
taking our speculations too seriously, when they are not sufficiently related to possible evidence for their 
truth or falsity. Least of all should we aim to rigidly organize people by insisting on speculative dogma of 
whatever sort, social, political, religious, or scientific. 
IV. How is Objective Observation Possible?
Knowing Quine’s writings, and his critique of analyticity in particular, one finds reason to think that one 
Quinean tendency of thought might answer the initial Kantian question in the Lectures (“How are synthetic 
judgments possible a priori?”) by flatly arguing that there is no sensible division between the analytic and the 
synthetic, so that purely “synthetic judgments” are not at all possible a priori, or otherwise. (Cf. the opening 
of Quine, 1960, “Carnap and Logical Truth.”) Again, one may notice at the end of the final Lecture that 
Quine rejects the Kantian “thing-in-itself.” Still, we might best understand the summary of Quine’s 
philosophy contained in these four short lectures, in terms of a recovery or reinterpretation of Kant’s question 
away from Kant’s own too-rigid philosophical categories. While Quine rejects an absolute distinction 
between analytic and synthetic, the a priori and the empirical,6 he certainly does allow for grades of observa-
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tionality and grades of theoreticity. He takes a skeptical eye to the meaningfulness of all those claims lacking 
firmer relation to observation. But he also acknowledges the “theory-laden”7 character of observation and in-
sists, against his positivist forbearers, on the need for theory not strictly definable in observational terms. 
When Quine puts his own question in the lectures as “a plainer one,” but a question which “expresses 
much the same concern,” he invites us to understand his question as a variation on Kant’s. Quine asks, “How, 
on the strength of mere sporadic triggering of our sensory receptors, is it possible to fabricate our elaborate 
theory of other minds and the external world?” His answer is a purportedly empirical theory of mind and 
language, or we might say, it is a theory, and partly a normative theory, of that which we bring to sensation 
and which allows for the development of mind, language, and cognition. Consider here, for instance, Quine’s 
comments on our in-born standards of perceptual similarity, sometimes spoken of as a matter of “quality 
spacing.” From this perspective, at least, Quine offers a theory of the human and scientific sensibility, much 
as Kant did more extravagantly, with his categories and forms of intuition. Quine is partly focused on origins,
in the sense of explaining the first steps of language learning; but in the end he suggests something of how we 
bring, and might best bring, our existing conceptual resources to the task of observation and ultimately that of 
the evaluation of theory. How, in general, is science or objective cognition possible, which requires observa-
tion, and an observational language, acknowledged as always “theory-laden?” Or, we might try to get a bit 
closer to Quine: “How is observation and observational language possible in spite of our scientific, theore-
tical, and common-sense preconceptions? While our preconceptions are not now widely considered a priori, 
Quine acknowledges their influence on observation. Arguably, we always bring something with us to 
observation, and how, then, is objective “synthesis” possible? 
In Quinean terms, we begin with “in-born” standards of observational similarity, and subsequently these 
standards of similarity or “proximity” are elaborated in consequence of the felt success of related behavior, 
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and our observational judgments are thus colored by this partly in-born and partly acquired “sensibility,” 
structuring our reports of observation. 
How is objective observation possible? Part of the answer, though not one given in the Lectures, is that 
even theory-laden observation sentences may be found false in light of the very observations which they 
structure. For instance, though Einstein required his alternative concepts the relations of space, time, and 
matter, in order to make predictions about the curving of starlight in the vicinity of the sun during a total 
eclipse, those working in a Newtonian framework could still make the observational measurements which the 
Newtonian approach failed to predict. We make our observations, and know what observations to make, in 
light of elaborate theory and the conflicts of theories.
Quine is noted for his elaborate and rigorous account of scientific or cognitive language, including his 
“canonical language” of science sketched in logical and mathematical detail in the Lectures, and he is noted 
as well for his behavioristic theory of observational language. All of this is amply but concisely developed in 
the pages of the Kant Lectures. Quine characterizes a sentence as observational, if it can be learned through 
ostension. So, even an observation sentence laden with theoretical pre-conceptions can be learned by 
ostension, though this will only be expected within particular local or specialized communities of speakers 
who are familiar with the theory or system of beliefs in question. 
Wolfgang Stegmller famously argued for a firm connection between Quine’s behavioristic conception of 
observation sentences and his expressed desire to avoid “cultural relativism” (Stegmller, 1987, pp. 
310-311). Quine’s expressed objective of avoiding relativism concerning the truth of theories can be found in 
the Kant Lectures at the end of the lecture series, and this in spite of his reaffirming there his doctrines of the 
empirical indeterminacy of meaning, reference, and ontology. Quine argues for the importance of a 
structuralistic similarity among empirically equivalent but distinct translations and theories, or conceptual 
systems and ontologies, though observational evidence does not and cannot decide among such alternatives. 
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Since on Quine’s conception any observation sentence can be learned by ostension, the objectivity of ob-
servation appears assured, by reference to the physicalistic and empirical psychology of stimulus and 
response. 
But given that Quine allows that observation sentences may be theory-laden, and in view of the fact that it 
is only observation sentences (or “observational categoricals” and their components) interpreted in relation to 
particular theories, that can lend support or refute those particular theories, it appears that the specific inter-
pretations which we give to observation sentences, in relation to contending theories, do have an important 
role to play. While it is true, as Quine insists, that we cannot always see how to bring observational evidence 
into meaningful contact with theories, in order to decide among claims apparently reasonable from the point 
of view of “mentalistic semantics,” still it appears that on his own grounds he must allow for meaning and 
meanings, beyond the level of stimulus meaning and ostensively acquired observation sentences, if he is to 
allow the specific role of the theory-laden character of observation sentences as evidence relevant to theory. 
At a minimum, he must allow that in paradigm cases of decisions among competing theories by reference 
to empirical evidence, particular theoretical interpretations of observational terms have a role to play. For 
instance, Einstein’s theory of special relativity played a special role in the selection and interpretation of ob-
servations of star-light, and the displaced distances between stars observed, in the vicinity of the sun during a 
total eclipse — though the Newtonians could make and report the same observations. At least part of the 
point here is that on the Newtonian theory, we would not expect these observations or expect them to have 
the significance which they actually have, something better understood through their relation to Einstein’s 
physics.
Relevant observation sentences, interpreted neutrally or merely by reference to the psychology of stimulus 
and response do not bear upon either alternative theory, it is only as “theory-laden” in one or the other way, 
interpreted in relation to theory, that they can confirm Einstein’s prediction, say, of the effect of mass on 
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spatial distance and the paths of light, or show the lack of a similar prediction in the prior theory. So, it 
appears that Quine’s general characterization of observation sentences is useful in distinguishing genuine 
observation, primarily after the fact, i.e., after the chief work of theory in guiding observation has already 
been done. We get no effective means of deciding what to count as an observation sentence in complete 
independence of theoretical, even speculative theoretical, developments. Not only do we bring a generalized 
sense of perceptual similarity and proximity to observation and observational language, we are also looking 
to confirm and support, or to refute, particular theoretical approaches, particular expectations, or plans of 
experimental research — employing and coloring our observational language. For any empiricism, related 
points will surely have a place of honor suited to guide scientific theory and practice. The point may be taken 
as an elaboration on Quine’s turn toward pragmatism.
V. Meaning, Belief, and Theory
The distinctive semantic theses which follow in the wake of Quine’s methodological behaviorism have 
typically evoked great interest and much debate, at least since the publication of Word and Object. If we are 
to surrender the traditional conceptions of linguistic and cognitive meaning, linked to the analytic-synthetic 
distinction, then what substitute or replacement is to be expected in the light of Quinean criticisms? One chief 
direction of development regarding this has been the attempt, in light of Quine’s distinction between the 
theory of meaning and the theory of referential notions, to reconstruct the theory of cognitive meaning within
the (basically Tarskian) theory of reference. Certainly this requires some substantial emphasis on the 
empirical basis of interpretation and/or belief attribution, if Quine’s criticisms of mentalistic semantics and 
the myth of the museum are to be properly taken into account.
Quine’s doubts, as expressed in the Lectures, on the meaningfulness of belief attribution, where the 
evidence for the claim expressing the belief remains unclear, can certainly be viewed as a normative caution 
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against uncritical bandwagon effects on cognition. While it may plausibly be argued that someone’s believing 
or not believing that the author of the Iliad was blind, to take Quine’s example, consists in more than a simple 
disposition to assent or dissent from some particular sentence, it does seem important to ask and answer the 
question of what else of an empirical character may be involved. One important kind of answer is expressed 
in the observation of more systematic coherence among statements of belief which allows for checking and 
idealization in terms of theories over particular domains of discourse. But if we understand particular 
sentences in relation to both theoretical or systematic relevancy, empirically ascertained (as also suggested 
by “interpretive” approaches to the social sciences), and in relation to actual or potential evidence for such 
systems or complexes of sentences, then in the armory of Quinean arguments, this puts a particular pressure 
on Quine’s argument from “proxy functions.” 
If proxy functions merely produce possible alternatives to particular systematized beliefs or sets of 
sentences, and we cannot say what is to count as evidence apart from a theoretical context, then this suggests 
that the proxy functions do not demonstrate Quine’s “ontological relativity” and “inscrutability of reference” 
in quite the way he proposes; and we may better think of “indeterminacy of meaning” as fundamentally a 
matter of vagueness. No doubt, whatever means we have to determine the reference of expressions of our 
language will not settle every possible question. Our determination of reference can be no more precise than 
our accounts of the world, and these will always leave some unanswered questions about sameness and 
difference of objects. We should not expect anything we can say about the reference of given expressions to 
ever be anything more than relatively determinate.
This point explains what is going on in Quine’s “freedom with proxy function.” This is speculative 
paraphrase or reinterpretation which may or may not prove to be of any use. But since such speculative re-
interpretation is always possible, as a mathematical possibility, it counts not at all against the specific inter-
pretations we have of expressions, linked as they are to a theory of what there is to refer to with our words. 
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That alternative ways to interpret expressions of a theory exist proves not at all that they have not been inter-
preted correctly or cogently; and it provides no grounds for generalized skepticism concerning the cogency of 
referential semantics. Any such conclusion can be resisted on grounds of fallibilism. The mere fact that we 
could be wrong in our beliefs is a reason to keep them open to further inquiry, but it is not a reason for 
keeping them under a skeptical cloud (Cf. Callaway, 1993, pp. 113-116).
The significance of belief attribution, from this perspective has to do with the ways in which particular 
systems of beliefs, or particular interpreted theories, tend to guide further research and inquiry. It is a 
significant indication of agreement on theory if we agree not only on observational consequences but also on 
the best range of projects for further inquiry. While I would not think that Quine would endorse exactly this 
approach to his problems and questions, it does at least seem to take in the rejection of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction and also avoid the criticisms directed at mentalistic semantics. From this perspective, the meaning 
of a particular sentence is the difference it would make to an embedding system of belief, or suitably 
idealized theory, if it and the logical implications which arise in view of it, were removed. Quine would no 
doubt tend to resist such a “moderate holist” or contextualist solution, favoring his established relation to the 
British tradition of Humean skepticism in contrast, say, to the common-sense empiricism of Reid or even the 
critical common-sensism of C. S. Peirce. Still, in many ways, J. L. Austin is closer to a critical com-
mon-sensism. 
H.G. Callaway
Mainz, July 2003 
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NOTES:
1Willard Van Orman Quine, Wissenschaft und Empfindung, Die Immanuel Kant Lectures, translated and 
introduced by H.G. Callaway, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart, 2003.
2 Cf. Quine 1981, The Pragmatists’ Place in Empiricism.
3 Cf. Quine 1960, Word and Object, p. 251 with reference to J. B. Conant, Quine wrote: “But meanwhile let 
us keep in mind also that knowledge normally develops in a multiplicity of theories, each with its limited util-
ity and each, unless it harbors more danger than utility, with its internal consistency. These theories overlap 
very considerably, in their so-called logical laws and in much else, but that they add up to an integrated and 
consistent whole is only a worthy ideal and happily not a prerequisite of scientific progress.” The italics 
are not in the original. Quine recognized here the factual pluralism of the sciences, but not the possibility that 
this pluralism might remain permanently or further develop. 
4 Cf. Dewey et al. 1945, “Are Naturalists Materialists?”
5 Cf. Palmer 1976.
6 Cf. Dewey 1938, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 18.
7 Cf. Quine 1992, Pursuit of Truth, p. 9.
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